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Key:  
  
SO = Sue Onslow (interviewer) 
RC = Roger Carrick (respondent) 
s.l. = sounds like  
 
SO: This is Sue Onslow talking to Sir Roger Carrick at the Royal Overseas 
League in Park Street, St James’s on 6 February 2013. Sir Roger, thank 
you very much indeed for talking to me. I wonder if you could begin by 
commenting, please, on Foreign Office views on the Commonwealth in 
the 1960s. You joined the Foreign Office in 1956, but this is an 
organisation which evolved considerably between 1956 and 1965. What 
are your recollections of how Britain saw the Commonwealth in this 
particular decade? 
 
RC: Well, I joined the Foreign Office, not the Commonwealth Relations Office. The 
two merged in the ’60s. I went off to my first posting abroad behind the Iron 
Curtain and didn’t give a single thought to the Commonwealth! Except, 
perhaps, that an ‘Old Commonwealth’ member’s diplomatic mission would 
look after the interests in a third country of other members not represented 
there. In Bulgaria, exceptionally, my wife Hilary worked in the British Legation 
as Pro-Consul and among other things operated Australia’s then ‘White 
Australia’ immigration policy for Canberra. (In those days, and until the early 
’70s, lady members of the British Diplomatic Service, as Hilary had been, had 
to resign on marriage; but we had a ‘visa war’ with Bulgaria and Hilary 
replaced a UK-based officer whose intended successor was refused a visa.) 
At that time, in the very early ‘60s, before the merger, apart from the Planning 
Staff and far-sighted thinkers, nobody much in the Foreign Office gave a lot of 
thought to the Commonwealth because that was the business of the 
Commonwealth Relations Office. After the merger, there were cultural 
resentments, but they really were very few. The Commonwealth Relations 
Office and Commonwealth Service and the Diplomatic Service and Foreign 
Office came together culturally much more smoothly than, for example, BOAC 
and BEA combined as two different and previously competing airlines. 
Perhaps the clue is in the competing, because the two (the FO and CRO) 
were complementary, so they didn’t compete very much at all. That said, 
there was some limited resentment within each service of the other, and of 
the merger. The Commonwealth Relations Office, in the view of the Foreign 
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Office, was overstaffed, over resourced and rich; and was able to have a 
comfortable existence: no doubt that view was exaggerated, but it was 
around. The Foreign Office also thought the CRO both were over-promoted 
and promoted most of their members before the merger, conveniently 
enough. Perhaps there were reciprocal views in the CRO. But it was 
remarkable how quickly all that died away. Indeed in 1971 when I was posted 
to a Commonwealth country it was not a particular surprise. Had I been 
posted to Singapore in the early ’60s, I would’ve felt very uncomfortable – as 
if I were leaving my regiment and going to another. But by the time 1970 
came, one really didn’t think that way. There was still some deliberate policy 
going on in the merged Foreign and Commonwealth Office to promote cross-
fertilization of the two cultures which were very different cultures; so it was 
thought a good thing that my boss in Singapore was from the Foreign Office, 
the number two was originally from the Commonwealth Office and I was the 
number three, if you like, as Head of Chancery. We had another counsellor as 
well and to mix them was thought a good thing. But all that stuff died very 
quickly.  So the view of the FCO was fairly well homogeneous by the end of 
the period we’re discussing. 
 
SO: So there was no sense that the Commonwealth had actually lost a 
Cabinet voice with the merger of the Foreign Office with the 
Commonwealth Relations Office? 
 
RC: Well, not that I discerned. The first Permanent Under-Secretary of the merged 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office was a Commonwealth Relations Office 
man. There was a great negotiation that led to that. Now some Foreign 
Secretaries have been more interested in the Commonwealth since then than 
others and I’m told - I don’t know how true it is - that one said he wanted to be 
known as the Foreign Secretary, not the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Secretary because it’s too much of a mouthful. That disappointed, I suppose, 
Commonwealth people a bit; but only a bit: what’s in a name? The Foreign 
Secretary, if you will, or the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary or the 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs more formally, does 
all the Commonwealth work including arguing its case in the Cabinet and I 
think as in some other external matters the view of the Prime Minister is 
important in that as well. But I was then in a lowly position: I’m not sure I was 
in a position to discern, in those days, anything much in the way of high 
politics. It seemed to me that the merger was carefully crafted, well negotiated 
and despite some cultural differences, the merged FCO got on with the job 
pretty quickly and rather well, and therefore the Commonwealth input to any 
policy discussion became as much part of the input to any policy discussion 
as any other influence, be it the EEC/EU, or relations with France or 
whatever. 
 
SO: You arrived in Singapore in January 1972? 
 
RC: Yes. 
 
SO: This was within a year of the first non-emergency Commonwealth Heads 
of Government Meeting being held outside the UK, which of course was 
chaired by Lee Kwan Yew, the Prime Minister of Singapore. Did you pick 
up on any reverberations on British\Commonwealth relations following 
on from that Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting? 
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RC: It was actually in February that I arrived and there were some reverberations 
going around town. Much gratitude that the British Prime Minister had decided 
to have his suits made in Singapore while he was there and some feeling in 
the High Commission that we were jolly lucky, we members of the High 
Commission, to be able to buy the left over desk lamps from the British 
delegation! I still have one, since we bought them personally. But as far as I 
gathered when I got there - and I was busy with the new job of looking at the 
withdrawal of the troops of Singapore and so on - as far as I recall there was 
a sense that Lee Kwan Yew had much enjoyed chairing the first 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting outside the UK; that Ted 
Heath and Alec Douglas Home, who was the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Secretary of the day, had done a good job. It had been regarded as 
immensely hard work in the view of some High Commission staff, I seem to 
remember – but perhaps that’s part of the attitude, the ethos and the 
difference between CRO and FCO methods of work, I’m not sure. But I don’t 
remember anything else except a feeling of ‘That went rather well didn’t it?’ so 
I suppose a feeling of relief. But had I been there at the time I would’ve been 
able to answer your question much more intelligently and in a much more 
informed fashion. 
 
SO: I’m just wondering because the way that it was presented in the press 
beforehand was that this CHOGM was going to be enormously 
contentious because of British sales of aircraft carrier parts to South 
Africa. I know that there was an enormous amount of tension within the 
Commonwealth on this issue. But, of course, it was also the venue at 
which the Singapore Declaration was put together and agreed. 
 
RC: That was done at the time, yes. 
 
SO: Indeed, so most of your work while you were in Singapore was focused 
on the East of Suez withdrawal negotiations? 
 
RC: A great deal of it, yes, and it was bilateral which is probably another reason 
why the Commonwealth Heads of Government problems had been done, 
dusted, put away as far as the work that the High Commission was doing. It 
was bilateral work and really very practical. Really the wider Commonwealth 
event was all over by the time I got there and I don’t remember discerning any 
tensions that could be ascribed to that, left on the ground in terms of 
UK/Singapore bilateral relations. 
 
SO: Was there an element of a Commonwealth dimension to the solution of 
Lee Kwan Yew’s concerns about the implications of British withdrawal 
from Singapore - the potential for a political and military vacuum with 
the perceived Communist threat from further north, as this was at the 
time of the Cold War? 
 
RC: Definitionally yes, but the solution was an Australian/New Zealand/UK 
operation, rather than Commonwealth. The ANZUK Force, as I recall it, was 
not called a Commonwealth force; it was not a Commonwealth force. It was a 
force constructed for political reasons to fill the perception of a political 
vacuum. It was designed not to last long, which it didn’t. It lasted just as long 
as it was needed and it didn’t really impinge on the broader Commonwealth, 
because the only people directly were those who contributed troops to it and 
those who were affected on the ground, hence Singapore and Australia, New 
Zealand, UK. 
 4 
 
SO: You said that there was a subsidiary intelligence group. 
 
RC: Well, as part of the ANZUK force which we wrote down on a piece of paper 
with two stars at the top which became, I think it was, an Australian two-star 
officer - I think a Rear Admiral – the first one in charge. As part of that force 
structure there was an intelligence group which is fairly normal in force 
structures. It amused me that we were full of acronyms even in those days; 
not only was there ANZUK, there was actually ANZUKIG(S) which few people 
are given to pronounce. So it was just a part of the force, but because it was 
an intelligence group, civilian diplomats sat on it. I didn’t (except perhaps 
once), but others did. 
 
SO: Within the Commonwealth at that particular time, was there any element 
of a Malaysian/Singapore angle? Obviously the Federation of Malaysia 
and Singapore had dissolved in the 1960s and I just wondered, again, 
was there any residue of bilateral tension between the two countries 
that you observed, or really was this a non-story by the 1970s? 
 
RC: I think that early tension was mostly over, but that doesn’t mean to say there 
were no tensions at all: they were bilateral tensions between two 
neighbouring countries. They covered questions such as water supply from 
Johor to Singapore; what exactly should happen to the Causeway railway 
issues: the Malaysians still owned the strip of Singapore on which the railway 
line sat. That wasn’t so much a dispute as a matter of negotiation that went 
on for years and years and was eventually resolved perfectly happily long, 
long after I’d left Singapore. But those were examples of the sort of bilateral 
Singapore and Malaysian issues that were still around and in some sense 
could be related back to the Federation, but had nothing directly to do with the 
UK, still less the Commonwealth. 
 
SO: You said also that there had been an element of tension between Kuala 
Lumpur and Singapore on aspects such as terrorism in Songkhla. 
 
RC: Well there were differences of assessments as to what was really going on on 
the Malaysia/Thai border up in Songkhla province that I dimly recall, because 
we had our own views and assessments of that. We would discuss them as 
friendly countries do, to try to understand better what was going on; there 
were occasional disagreements, but they were the disagreements of debate 
not of serious policy. There’s an awful lot of history, of course, in the 
Malaysian/Singapore relationship, but while I was serving there, early ’72 to 
late ’74, there were no major issues that I recall: the occasional flare-up with 
Malaysian internal problems that worried the Singaporeans but didn’t cause 
great tension between them. 
 
SO: When you became Counsellor at the British Embassy in Washington in 
1978, you were the JIC representative at the Embassy. 
 
RC: I was, and I had another job as well, yes. 
 
SO: In the run up to the outbreak of the Falklands War and during the 
Falklands campaign, was there any Commonwealth dimension to your 
work? 
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RC: Very, very little. There was, what the Americans called, a Commonwealth 
Liaison Group of ‘old’ Commonwealth members and the CIA; but when I say 
CIA, I mean always the analytical side (I had nothing to do with the 
operational side), i.e. the assessment of the intelligence and not its gathering. 
The group met regularly. Once we got into serious pre-Falklands invasion 
time I think I was not working with anybody but the Brits and the Americans, 
because we had a major task to do to overcome opposition within the 
American administration – perhaps half of it and some of it highly placed – to 
the idea of America supporting Britain in the Falklands campaign. Without that 
support, we couldn’t have done it because we needed petrol, oil and 
lubricants, for example, ferried from Virginia across to Ascension Island. 
Certainly my Commonwealth colleagues - the ‘old’ Commonwealth in 
particular because of the intelligence arrangements among us - would ring me 
to ask, ‘How’s it going?’ and I would give them a quick burst. But there was no 
serious Commonwealth involvement in my JIC work in Washington on the 
Falklands conflict. 
 
SO: So then any label of a ‘ Commonwealth Liaison Group’ in fact was a 
misnomer? 
 
RC: My JIC work on had become overwhelmingly bilateral because of the 
Falklands. But it is something of a misnomer. Looked at from the academic or 
historical assessment point of view, what it really reflects is the understanding 
among Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the UK with the US as the senior 
partner, if you wish, although we felt it was fairly important at the time to share 
intelligence assessments, to debate them and to try to arrive at a common 
view, because that was in the interests of getting to the right, or best view. 
 
SO: That then suggests to the American administration the Commonwealth 
remained the ‘old’ Commonwealth. 
 
RC: Well to the CIA analytical side, yes. That wasn’t true of the State Department 
who knew far better of course, but it was a convenient name; that’s all. 
 
SO: I understand also that New Zealand membership, or contribution to this 
Liaison Group, was suspended for a while. 
 
RC: Yes: it was as a result of the New Zealand government of the day refusing 
permission for principally the American, but also other NATO navies to enter 
New Zealand harbours, mainly Auckland, of course. It stemmed from the then 
New Zealand policy against any nuclear involvement and the NATO policy of 
not declaring whether or not any given ship had nuclear weapons aboard or, I 
think, even whether or not it was nuclear-propelled. That New Zealand policy 
irritated the Americans, not too surprisingly, including because of their 
responsibilities for security in the Pacific. 
 
SO: So this was a separate issue to New Zealand’s protests against French 
nuclear testing at Mururoa? 
 
RC: Yes. You could say that they’re linked because they both have to do with 
things nuclear and Mururoa was about nuclear testing and looking after 
nuclear weapons, but I saw Mururoa as a separate issue. The Australians 
became very cross over Mururoa and that could have become quite a 
Commonwealth issue. The CHOGM that immediately followed Mururoa, if I 
remember, was in New Zealand. 
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SO: In Auckland in 1995. 
 
RC: Yes and the Retreat was in Queenstown in the South Island of New Zealand, 
if I recall aright. I was in Australia at the time. The principal problem before 
CHOGM in 1995 was Nigeria, and that rather dominated everything. 
 
SO: So you went as British High Commissioner to Canberra in 1994, the year 
before Auckland as you say: were there tensions between Britain and 
Australia over Mururoa? 
 
RC: Yes, there were indeed. 
 
SO: Was this a bilateral point of friction which has Commonwealth 
implications? 
 
RC: I’m not sure... well, we’re both members of the Commonwealth, and CHOGM 
happened that year, as you say. But I think that’s about all because it wasn’t a 
matter that gave rise to any wider discussion or problem at the CHOGM that 
followed it; it was a bilateral dispute between originally New Zealand and then 
Australia and non-Commonwealth member France. Australia’s first 
pronouncement by the then Foreign Minister Gareth Evans on the subject of 
Muroroa was fairly reasonable, but then the Prime Minister, Paul Keating, 
elevated the issue and took a stronger view - one much closer to the New 
Zealanders and very anti-French. So there was an Australian/French dispute 
which I think was handled on the Australian side as well as it could have been 
by the Foreign Minister, but not by anybody else in the whole country, 
because they were passionately anti-French and did some pretty disgraceful 
things, a few of which I have described briefly in my book [R Carrick, 
Diplomatic Anecdotage – around the world in 40 years (2012)]. We took the 
side of the French. They were a nuclear power; we were a nuclear power.  
We took the firm view that the French were one of the nuclear powers who 
had kept the Cold War from becoming a hot war; and we supported them in 
their statement that their actions in Muroroa were designed to ensure the 
safety of their nuclear weapons; and it wasn’t right for any ally to complain 
about that because it was in Australia’s and indeed New Zealand’s interests 
that the weapons be kept safe. So we were very much with the French on that 
issue and personally I was pretty appalled at what went on in Australia and its 
body politic. 
 
SO: How much did this become a personal issue between two Prime 
Ministers, the British Prime Minister and the Australian Prime Minister? 
 
RC: Well, they met at CHOGM, but it wasn’t a great issue there partly because I 
think it was managed which, if you like, was my job; and partly because of the 
Commonwealth crisis of the time. There’s very often a crisis or near-crisis at 
CHOGM: that time it was over Nigeria, so Mururoa was rather put into the 
shade and didn’t get much of a mention, if at all. Whether the two Prime 
Ministers had a bilateral chat about it I honestly don’t remember. 
 
SO: Did you use your own initiative to manage this crisis in the run up to 
CHOGM or had you been asked by Downing Street or by Paul Keating’s 
office? 
 
RC: It’s called diplomacy, isn’t it? 
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SO: Yes, it is! 
 
RC: Yes. I did what I could in the circumstances and I think I would have acted on 
my own because I could see a row coming; indeed I was in the middle of a 
row and I didn’t want that row to transfer itself to CHOGM where it could’ve 
gone silly. It was pretty silly anyway but it could’ve gone sillier. 
 
SO: So Paul Keating didn’t phone you up and say, ‘Roj, could you sort it 
out?’ 
 
RC: He thought it would be a good idea if I were to fix it so he didn’t have a row 
with John Major. I expect John Major had a similar view although I don’t 
remember my own Prime Minister ringing me. 
 
SO: But you were in Australia during the CHOGM meeting? 
 
RC: Yes, I didn’t go to New Zealand then.  
 
SO: After Paul Keating was replaced by John Howard, did the personal 
tensions between the two Prime Ministers ease? 
 
RC: Yes, instantly. They are both very keen cricketers and experts on cricket. 
They’re both high Tories, which sometimes matters, although after a sticky 
start John Howard got on very well with Tony Blair later; but tensions did 
ease, yes. The two Johns knew each other and liked each other. Mind you, I 
think Paul Keating didn’t dislike John Major; I think he just took very different 
political views. 
 
SO: Also during your time as High Commissioner in Canberra, was there an 
element of Commonwealth intelligence liaison? 
 
RC: I suppose there was a little. My staff and I dealt mostly with the bilateral 
arrangements between Australia and the UK. I was keen on that because we 
and the Australians had done some good work together in Indonesia and I 
thought we could do more if we stirred it a little more. I did see something of 
the intelligence community in Australia; indeed there were exchange officers 
between the two sets of agencies, so I used to go and see them occasionally.  
I think there was the odd occasion when the Canadian and New Zealanders 
and we had a chat about something or other, but it was pretty informal and 
the New Zealanders, especially, probably had their own separate bilateral 
arrangements. Again that’s bilateral or trilateral or at most quadrilateral, not 
Commonwealth-wide. 
 
SO: Again a misnomer then? 
 
RC: I think it’s just an easy, convenient name for what used to be called the ‘old’ 
Commonwealth. 
 
SO: Yes, so for instance there might not have been any intelligence sharing 
in analysis of the acceleration of the Pakistani nuclear programme in the 
1990s, and a growing stand-off in terms of dangers to hemispheric 
defence and stability? 
 
RC: I don’t recall any more than bilateral discussions in Australia of those issues. 
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SO: How far did you observe, as High Commissioner, that there was a 
particular regional dimension to the Commonwealth with Australia’s 
engagement with the Pacific Commonwealth? 
 
RC: Well, that was quite a subject. We had a sort of bilateral interest in the Pacific.  
There had been some British colonies, of course, in the Pacific. There were 
some residual responsibilities. There was an aid programme. There was the 
South Pacific Forum, which may still exist, I don’t know, which was a forum 
under which some aid budget supported projects were managed. At the time 
we, the UK (as opposed to nowadays, when I worry about our ability wisely 
and accountably to spend such a high aid budget) we were rather trying to 
focus and even retrench our aid: the South Pacific was not the highest aid 
priority for Britain. So that had to be managed, and there is, of course, a good 
number of Commonwealth countries across the Pacific. But again, the issue 
wasn’t Commonwealth wide; I don’t remember papers from the Secretary 
General on the subject. It was dealt with as far as my High Commission was 
concerned as a UK/Pacific matter with, also, some discussions with Australia: 
we were probably trying to persuade the Australians to pick up some of the 
projects we were thinking we ought to withdraw from because we couldn’t do 
everything with limited resources. 
 
SO: I was just wondering whether within the broader Commonwealth you 
could identify broader power centres - say Nigeria, as a leading West 
African nation within the Commonwealth in West Africa; South Africa in 
the southern hemisphere; Australia in the South East Asia/Pacific 
region. 
 
RC: Yes, I think one can. I think it’s worth saying at this point that the 
consciousness of the Commonwealth in the body politic and society in 
general in Australia, at least in the sophisticated end of Australia, is rather 
higher than I feel it to be in the UK. Commonwealth Day is celebrated, 
commemorated, not only by the Federal Government in Australia every year, 
but also by state governments, so New South Wales would have its 
Commonwealth Day and there were Commonwealth societies here and there 
around Australia, including in the states as far away as Western Australia, far 
away from Canberra I mean. There was quite a lot of Australian 
consciousness of the Commonwealth, so that when things went nasty in 
Africa, Nigeria or whatever it was, and the ‘wise men’ groupings were formed 
within the Commonwealth, it was no surprise even when Africa was 
concerned, to find that the Australian Foreign Minister was a member of a 
small group and working away jolly hard to try to help. When Commonwealth 
Day was celebrated, the Commonwealth High Commissioners in Australia 
would all turn up and have a sort of Commonwealth gathering. But I do 
remember admiring how much notice Australia took of the fact that the 
Commonwealth existed. (Though I also wondered whether Australian school 
children understood the difference between the Commonwealth of Australia 
and the Commonwealth.) In the bad old days when it was called the British 
Commonwealth they probably did. In the days when Prime Minister Billy 
Hughes of Australia was waxing very eloquent at the Versailles Peace 
Conference they knew what a dominion was and they knew what later 
became, I suppose, the Commonwealth: what influence it could wield; how 
important it was; and how important the Australian armed forces were to the 
conduct of World War I and later World War II. But that history stems from 
empire and Churchill’s phrase about overlapping circles. The residual, the 
 9 
legacy of all that in a history as condensed as modern Australia’s is, into, 
now, 225 years, makes a bigger impression on the Australian political psyche 
than it does in the UK; and I found that interesting. It may help to explain that 
when the Australians (and no doubt the New Zealanders too but certainly the 
Australians to my knowledge) get involved in the Commonwealth, they mean 
it, and they work jolly hard at it and they’re a good Commonwealth member. 
 
SO: So it’s become part of their DNA? It’s part of their cultural identity? 
 
RC: Yes, certainly while I was there it was discernibly so. 
 
SO: Yes. Have you been back to Australia and observed any shift in that 
since? 
 
RC: I’ve been back pretty well every year and if there is any shift it’s a very slight 
dilution, but I haven’t tapped into that issue closely. 
 
SO: I’m going to suggest a provocative question: did you discern any 
element in Australia being an active Commonwealth member, of a 
certain constructive history on race relations in Australia? I wonder 
whether Australia’s good Commonwealth credentials stem at all from 
the domestic political implications, as Australia’s domestic history is 
more fraught with racial tension and genocide than an established 
acceptable narrative would have it. 
 
RC: No, I wouldn’t link those two. I think the Australia/Aboriginal problem has 
received more attention since I left Australia than it did in the 200 years or so 
before. My problem at the time was dealing with a myth running around some 
Australian circles that that great, great unsung British hero, Arthur Phillip, First 
Governor of Australia, and his men were cruel to the Aborigines. Untrue. The 
enlightened Phillip laid great stress on treating the Aborigines well [see R 
Carrick, London Papers in Australian Studies No.17 – Admiral Arthur Phillip 
RN, Founder & First Governor of Australia: A British view (n.d.)] But it then 
was becoming fashionable to believe that white men had been cruel. Later, 
much, much later than Arthur Phillip, there was the difficult history of the 
‘stolen children’ as they were called: in my time I shall never forget Lois 
O’Donoghue, a splendid lady, Chairman of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Commission, declaring that had she not been ‘stolen’ as a child and 
given a decent education she would not have been in the position she rose to 
– and, in her view and rightly, much more importantly – nor would she have 
been able to help her Aboriginal people. So there’s been a history of myth 
and unfairness in judging the issues and, since the British colonial time, there 
have been ups and downs with Aborigines. Government policies have not 
always worked well. I think they’re probably getting better now and I saw quite 
a lot of that on the ground. But I don’t think the connection you made strikes 
me as clear. 
 
SO: I’m very struck by the fact that Australia has been such a good 
contributor to the Commonwealth –the presence on the first Eminent 
Persons Group, its stance within CMAG - and yet Australia has got a 
complicated past itself. 
 
RC: A very complicated past, but whether that makes Australians more inclined to 
be good Commonwealth members or less, I don’t know. I don’t think it makes 
much difference. I think they just believe that the Commonwealth is a good 
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thing they ought to support and can support, including intellectually. Hence 
my point about Alexander Downer and the Eminent Persons Group. As both 
(the longest ever serving) Australian Foreign Minister and a senior 
Commonwealth figure, he deployed great intelligence, in my view, supported 
and defended the work of EPG’s, and was a valuable influence in the 
Commonwealth (as well as more widely: currently he is Special Adviser to the 
UN Secretary-General on Cyprus, helping the parties towards a 
comprehensive settlement – long and difficult task). 
 
SO: Yes. Have your attitudes to the Commonwealth, then, altered since you 
joined the Foreign Office in the 1960s to your retirement, aged 60, in 
1997? 
 
RC: I suppose one answer is they must have. They had to because I knew next to 
nothing at all about the Commonwealth when I joined and now I know a little.  
So they have changed a bit and I have learned to be impressed by the 
achievements and survivability of a 54-nation strong organisation with such 
disparities and such different forms of government and such different views 
as to what they gain from the Commonwealth. I remember being particularly 
struck when non-English speaking Mozambique applied to join and now we 
have a Portuguese speaking member of the Commonwealth. It’s a 
commonplace to say so, but I do think that is a particular tribute to the 
reputation in Africa of the Commonwealth and the good it does there. Clearly 
Mozambique didn’t join because it would like to be part of a good 
organisation, but because it was in Mozambique’s interests to join. Disraeli 
said ‘interests never lie’, and I think he was mostly right at that. The 
perception of interest sometimes lies, but the Mozambique story is 
impressive. The work the Commonwealth does in development, quietly 
mostly, and in quiet development, is usually the best sort because the noisier 
it gets the more it wastes money and tends to be corrupt. The work it does in 
the academic world in bringing people together to stimulate work on 
international problems within the Commonwealth, I suppose, going all the way 
up to the Eminent Persons Group, is impressive. Although I can’t say I’m 
deeply impressed yet by the last great men’s Report on the form of the 
Commonwealth and the reception it got at the Commonwealth Heads of 
Government Meeting in Perth. The document is frankly far too long, with far 
too many recommendations. I’m a great admirer of Malcolm Rifkind who sat 
on that group. I’m a great admirer of his intellect and judgment. When he was 
a Minister of State in the Foreign Office he and I worked together on one 
particular issue and he was magnificent. I think he was also a very good 
Secretary of State for Defence and a very good Foreign Secretary. He is a 
great brain to have around London. But evidently even he couldn’t ensure that 
that Report was terse and pithy. It was too easy for heads of government to 
look at that document, to say: “oh this is far too complicated: we can’t deal 
with it now” and to kick it into the long grass. That was a pity.  But that’s a 
tangential point. 
 
SO: Would you identify Malcolm Rifkind then as one of those unusual British 
Foreign Secretaries who really did value the Commonwealth? 
 
RC: I think you’re a little harsh to say it’s unusual for a Foreign Secretary to value 
the Commonwealth! But I know what you mean and, as I said earlier, one of 
them did say once that he wanted to be known as ‘the Foreign Secretary.’  
Yes, certainly when he was Minister of State and he was dealing with parts of 
the world that included a lot of Commonwealth countries, I think he did value 
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the Commonwealth. I was in Australia for most of the time he was Foreign 
and Commonwealth Secretary so I’m not sure I can judge him ‘close to’. But I 
think it wasn’t that he favoured Commonwealth, or paid special attention to it. 
He gave it the attention it deserved, just as he gave foreign matters, non-
Commonwealth foreign matters the attention they deserved. That he does 
now work on the Commonwealth is also a positive answer to your question. 
 
SO: Do you think Britain at that particular point benefited from the enormous 
sense of relief that permeated King Charles Street that the South African 
issue was finally off the agenda as far as the Commonwealth was 
concerned. That Britain had contributed to the anti-apartheid struggle 
and the successful, political transition in South Africa? 
 
RC: I think probably so. I was a long way away from South Africa geographically 
at the time, but I shan’t forget (and I think I put this in my book) when Mandela 
visited Indonesia on his first sort of state visit abroad. The Foreign Minister of 
Indonesia formally presented the heads of mission to Mandela. I didn’t know 
Mandela at all then and the Foreign Minister presented me as the British 
Ambassador, and gave my name: Nelson Mandela stepped forward and gave 
me the longest and biggest bear hug I’ve ever experienced. I shan’t forget 
looking over his shoulder into the eyes of President Soeharto, whose 
Javanese mask had slipped a million miles! So Mandela was pleased with us.  
I knew why, from seeing some of the telegram traffic helpfully copied to UK 
heads of missions to Commonwealth countries. So I knew a little of what we’d 
done. I certainly was pleased and I felt some pride and relief, yes. 
 
SO: You’ve emphasised the unsung contribution that the Commonwealth 
makes to development, to education, to youth, etc. 
 
RC: Yes. 
 
SO: But looking at it also as an elite network, how important do you think 
are the personalities at heads of government level, or is there an 
excessive personification of politics by the media, by the general public 
as far as Commonwealth get-togethers are concerned? 
 
RC: I think both of those two strands are correct. When there’s a big row about a 
country in Africa the media go ape about the Head of State or Government of 
that particular country.  On the other hand, they can be very important. I was 
in Lancaster House earlier today, in the room where all those, I think it’s 40, 
de-colonialisations were arranged between 1947 and the late ‘60s I suppose. 
 
SO: Well right up to 1979. 
 
RC: I suppose, yes. When was Zimbabwe? 
 
SO: ’79. 
 
RC: That was the last one, yes, I to Z, India to Zimbabwe. That gave me to think 
about things like the Zimbabwe Conference and Peter Carrington’s handling 
of Mugabe, a very different Mugabe from the one we know today. Absolutely 
brilliant work by Lord Carrington, our politician most concerned, who of 
course, had been well trained because he was a British High Commissioner 
to Australia, so he’s bound to be good, isn’t he! He was aged 37 when 
appointed High Commissioner. Anyway, the press made a big, big fuss about 
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all of that. Also, when Alec Douglas Home was struggling away in Lancaster 
House over Kenya and having tomatoes thrown at him, the press had several 
field days over that (and the British Legation in Sofia Bulgaria, where I was 
serving, was physically attacked over that issue). So the press do exaggerate 
it. Then matters become very complicated because how much are the 
‘personalities’ playing to the press, playing to the Brits, playing to the gallery, 
playing to their own domestic party at home and their opposition and so on. 
People in those positions make speeches which are designed to be 
understood in different ways, in different places, around the world. 
 
SO: Absolutely, to different audiences. 
 
RC: Yes and there was quite a lot of that in some of those de-colonialisation 
stories. But the Commonwealth somehow has a rôle in all that implicitly – in 
holding it all together. We haven’t mentioned the Queen and we should. We 
should because it is a quite extraordinary phenomenon the way she can bring 
the Commonwealth to its senses without appearing, including to the press, to 
do anything much at all, but actually she’s working very hard and has done 
some really fine work. The Heads of Commonwealth Governments all, rightly, 
respect her as far as I can see. 
 
SO: Did you see that yourself in any of your diplomatic postings, her 
extraordinary ability to provide the glue for the Commonwealth and to 
soothe ruffled souls? 
 
RC: No, I’ve only seen it at second hand. The Queen did not visit Australia while I 
was there. Prince Charles came just before I served there, and HM The 
Queen went soon afterwards, but that would have been a visit to her Realm, 
rather than a specifically Commonwealth event. I haven’t seen HM at 
CHOGM, but I’ve read about her leadership at CHOGMs. 
 
SO: How much do you feel that the Queen is one of the key explanations for 
how the Commonwealth has survived since 1965? 
 
RC: Well, I certainly think she’s one of them: a major explanation, if you will. The 
way The Queen has conducted herself as Head of the Commonwealth, and 
the way she has commanded and earned the respect she has, are quite 
extraordinary. You must ask Don McKinnon about that. 
 
SO: Yes, I intend to. 
 
RC: I think I know what Sonny Ramphal would say and indeed what Don would 
say. He’s so sound, Don; he would be very, very interesting on the subject. I 
think the Queen has been quite extraordinary and everybody says there’s 
going to be a crisis when she goes. Well we’ll see. There might not be; things 
are changing. 
  
SO: What other explanations would you give for the survival of the 
Commonwealth? 
 
RC: The self-interest of the members is probably the stickiest glue of the lot really.  
Think of Fiji who’ve been in and out, like a ‘fiddler’s elbow’, of the 
Commonwealth. I was visiting Fiji once with my wife, when Fiji had just been 
suspended, I was going to say ‘thrown out’ – ‘suspended’ was the word – 
from the Commonwealth. They’d just had another of their coups. Fiji worries 
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Australia a bit because it’s her backyard and Australia can’t control everything 
that goes on in Fiji, even though the constitution of Fiji was drafted in the 
Australian National University - says he with a little bit of trivia. We 
deliberately sought out Fijians we could talk to in a very, very short visit: the 
head of the local library, that sort of thing.  We found those Fijians desperate 
to come back in – and the sooner the better. They were also very keen to 
make it clear that the Fijian actions were in no way a reflection upon the 
Queen as Head of the Commonwealth.  
 
SO: So as explanations of the survival of the Commonwealth: the Queen; 
self-interest. 
 
RC: Yes, the self-interest and every nation likes to feel it belongs to a worthwhile 
club. Groucho Marx once said ‘I wouldn’t join a club that would have me as a 
member’; not quite relevant. But there is an instinct to want to have a voice at 
a large and important table and I should think that applies to nearly all, 
perhaps all of the Commonwealth members: they do see it as a national self-
interest to be a member of an important international organisation. They’re 
also members of the UN, of course, and I imagine that from time to time there 
is some attempt at Commonwealth coordination within the UN on issues of 
common concern. 
 
SO: So that would identify the particular strengths of the Commonwealth, as 
you say, its unique cohesion. What would you identify as its 
weaknesses? 
 
RC: Well, another strength, perhaps, would be its size; and that can also be a 
weakness, I think. The Commonwealth generally has quite a lot of respect 
outside the Commonwealth: that too may be a strength if I’m not exaggerating 
it. Its weaknesses probably do include size, in that it’s too big to attain the 
highest level of agreement – the highest common factor of agreement of 
aspiration; rather than the lowest common denominator of what can be written 
down and agreed to. So big that it tends to the lower common denominator 
rather than the highest common factor, I’d say. I think that point I made earlier 
about some reports to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting 
being so unwieldy as to be a weakness where there had been an opportunity 
for strength, that seems a pity and then if you look at the history wherever 
there is corruption that becomes, at some time, a Commonwealth matter and 
a weakness for the Commonwealth as an organisation if there is perceptually 
corruption within it. 
 
SO: Have you identified corruption within the Commonwealth? 
 
RC: I haven’t because I have not worked on that, but there’s enough corruption 
around the world I have found to know that some of the crises over the history 
of the Commonwealth might, at least, have the perception of corruption in 
some governments; and that’s a weakness. If the French or the Americans or 
the Germans or people whose support we needed at a UN vote, or the 
Russians or the Chinese (despite corruption in those countries), were to 
perceive corruption in a Commonwealth country about which there were a 
matter of interest to the UN, then those countries might not be so helpful to 
the Commonwealth – or even the British – interest. 
 
SO: So it’s a debilitating factor in questions of political influence. 
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RC: It can be. And the perception debilitates, I think, as much as the reality. 
 
SO: Yes.  So just in conclusion then, do you feel the Commonwealth has 
mattered in international politics, in the international community, since 
1965? 
 
RC: When was South Africa sorted? 
 
SO: ’94. 
 
RC: Yes well there you are: there’s just one example. You may say that was a 
South African solution to a South African problem; you may say it had 
bilateral influences from the UK and others, but I think there are some who 
would call that something of a Commonwealth success. I know less about 
Nigeria, but it was a great problem and the Commonwealth deliberations 
surely helped. It still can be an important problem, including because it’s the 
largest country in that part of Africa. But I think there are some successes and 
yes, surely the Commonwealth has changed, but it has changed to the extent 
that people want to join it – including some of the most unlikely countries. 
 
SO: Algeria? 
 
RC: Algeria, there you go! Prime Minister Cameron was there only the other day, I 
don’t know what he said to the President. 
 
SO: I can understand why South Sudan, Burma or Yemen would want to 
join, or indeed Palestine. 
 
RC: But would you have expected Mozambique?  Didn’t somebody tell me that 
Israel was considered at one stage? Very unlikely I would’ve thought, as 
members. So people do have respect for the Commonwealth, or at least see 
some national self-interest in wishing to be aligned, if not a member or it. I 
think when it was going through its changes from the ‘old’ British 
Commonwealth to the Commonwealth of Nations to the Commonwealth there 
was quite a rollercoaster really: I don’t think the rollercoaster has, in recent 
years, moved a lot.  It hasn’t sunk deep down, I think. Nor has it stopped.  
You should ask the Queen, she’ll give you a really informed view. 
 
SO: Oh, I’m sure she’s about to give me an interview! 
 
RC: Of course the Queen does not give interviews; and the Freedom of 
Information Act might actually be inhibiting. 
 
SO: Sir Roger, thank you very much indeed. 
 
RC: A real pleasure, Sue: thank you. 
 
[END OF AUDIOFILE] 
